Of Each Quasi-integral Part of Prudence

Of Each Quasi-integral Part of Prudence — St. Thomas Aquinas asks: Whether memory is a part of prudence?; Whether understanding is a part of prudence?; Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?; Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?; Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?; Whether foresight should be accounted a part of prudence?; Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?; Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?.

We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

Article 1: Whether memory is a part of prudence?

Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence.

Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above (). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be concluded from like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.

Article 2: Whether understanding is a part of prudence?

Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts "intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.

Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.

Article 3: Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?

Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.

As stated above (; ) prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not on thy own prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence

Article 4: Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?

Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs to prudence, as stated above (). Therefore shrewdness does also.

Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for {eustochia}, of which it is a part. For {eustochia} is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. ] who calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for {eustochia}, in general, hence he says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly."

Article 5: Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?

Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.

The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be numbered among these parts.

Article 6: Whether foresight should be accounted a part of prudence?

As stated above (, ), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.

Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.

Article 7: Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?

As stated above (), it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.

Since, however, prudence, as stated above () is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances.

Article 8: Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?

The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']."

The things with which prudence is concerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.