Of Liberality

Of Liberality — St. Thomas Aquinas asks: Whether liberality is a virtue?; Whether liberality is about money?; Whether using money is the act of liberality?; Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?; Whether liberality is a part of justice?; Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?.

We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely, covetousness and prodigality.

Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:

Article 1: Whether liberality is a virtue?

Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated." Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue.

As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.

Article 2: Whether liberality is about money?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money."

According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called open-handedness [largitas], because that which is open does not withhold things but parts of them. The term "liberality" seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it [liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term "money." Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money.

Article 3: Whether using money is the act of liberality?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of liberality.

The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated above (). Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.

Article 4: Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?

The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving."

It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of money is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in parting with a thing ---for instance, when we throw something---the farther we put it away the greater the force [virtus] employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect, since "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.

Article 5: Whether liberality is a part of justice?

Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to justice.

Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one's own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above (). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue.

Article 6: Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?

Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing." The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal."

Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things. Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself. Or for the good of others, or for God's glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which pertains to them consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.